Pragmatic Aspects of the Base-rate Fallacy
Author:
Laura Macchi a
| Affiliation: | a Universit degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy |
DOI:
10.1080/14640749508401384
Publication Frequency:
8 issues per year
Published in:
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A,
Volume
48,
Issue
1
February
1995
, pages 188
- 207
Formats available:
PDF
(English)
Now published as: The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
The circumstances under which this title is published have changed:
Reason for change: merged
Date of change: 2006
New ISSN: 1747-0218
New EISSN: 1747-1226
View Article:
View Article (PDF)
Abstract
An investigation was made of the role played by verbal structure in the problems used to study the base-rate fallacy, which has traditionally been attributed to the role of heuristics (e.g. causality, specificity). It was hypothesized that elements of the verbal form of text problems led to a misunderstanding of the question or the specific information, rendering obscure the independence of the sets of data (specific information is obtained independently from the base rate). Nine texts were presented to various groups of subjects: four were taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1980) and used as controls; five were obtained by modifying the verbal form of the original in order to reveal or conceal the links between the sets of data. The percentage of base-rate fallacies was greatly reduced with texts in which the independence of the data was clear, regardless of the causality and specificity of the information they contained (which was not changed). This result suggests that there is a need to consider the rules of natural language in order to move towards a better understanding of observed phenomena.
|
| view references (34) |

Download Citation
degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy
CiteULike
Del.icio.us
BibSonomy
Connotea