How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing? 1
Author:
Susanna Siegel
DOI:
10.1080/00048400600895961
Publication Frequency:
4 issues per year
Published in:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
Volume
84,
Issue
3
September
2006
, pages 429
- 441
Subject:
Philosophy;
Formats available:
HTML
(English)
:
PDF
(English)
Previously published as:
Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy
(1832-8660)
until 1947
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Abstract
I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
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*Earlier versions of this material were presented in Dubrovnic, NYU, Rijeka, Virginia, Taipei, and the Pacific APA. Thanks to audiences at those places for their responses, and to Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Amy Kind, Jim Pryor, Maja Spener, Daniel Stoljar, an anonymous referee, and especially Scott Sturgeon for criticism and advice.
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