It is now regularly asserted that the American and British invasion of Iraq was 'sold' using an intelligence case that was not only erroneous but skewed by political bias - if not manufactured outright. An examination of the interaction between the development of intelligence assessments and the key decisions on policy reveals that the key assessment was a possible but speculative link between terrorism and WMD, one that could not be supported by evidence of links between al-Qaeda and Iraq. While the assertion that such links existed had a major impact on American opinion, international opinion was more influenced by Iraqi pursuit of WMD in violation of UN resolutions. Although this was not controversial among the intelligence agencies, the reality was more complex and less dramatic. This did not become apparent until after the decision to go to war had been taken. The main problem with this decision may turn out to be less the exaggerated expectations of Iraqi WMD and more the benign expectations of the consequences of regime change.