This study examines the strategic and tactical logic of Israel's limited uses of force against Arab states and against substate actors. It evaluates the effectiveness of these policies, and their political and strategic ramifications. The study is based on a historical survey of these policies and on quantitative analysis of a dataset of the use of limited force by Israel over the 1949-2003 period. The findings suggest, first, that limited force strategies were occasionally used to foster escalation. In other cases, the mismanagement of limited engagements resulted in inadvertent escalation to full-blown wars. Second, domestic political and social considerations had important effects on the nature and intensity of Israeli uses of limited force. Third, Israeli reliance on offensive strategies has not only consistently failed, but produced adverse military and diplomatic side effects. Defensive and preventive measures have shown a much greater degree of success. The study concludes that a combination of military and diplomatic measures produces far more effective results than strictly military ones.