Given both corruption's and bureaucratic inefficiency's importance for development and good governance, understanding their causes is paramount. This paper argues that majority state ownership of most the most important economic sectors of a country results in higher levels of corruption and inefficiency. When political and managerial elites both own and manage the country's most important economic resources, they have greater incentives for corrupt or inefficient behavior. These elites use national resources at their disposal more for short-term personal and political goals than for long-term economic ones. This paper tests this hypothesis on a relatively underused, but often cited, data set from the 1980s. Using a cross-national, regression analysis, this paper finds that the best predictors a country's level of corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency are these: majority state ownership of significant economic sectors, levels of GDP per capita, levels of government spending, and levels of democracy. Other factors, such as common law heritage, percent of population that is Protestant, federalism, economic freedoms, or mineral/ oil exporting, were not consistent, significant predictors of either bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption. We also argue that Tobit may be the best estimation procedure for these data.