Historically, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were seen in the light of trust and social good with little need for regulation. However, given the concern with corporate fraud, the purpose of this entry is to examine whether, and the extent to which, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) should be applied to NGOs beyond the destruction of document (Section 802) and whistle-blower sections (Section 806) of the act. On the basis of data from 11 NGO court cases and IRS Form 990 for 34 mid-sized NGOs, this entry discusses risk exposure of NGOs, namely, the use of NGOs for personal gain, the proclivity to prey on the powerless, and the existence of large liquid assets in the face of low deficits and low reports of liabilities, which suggests that a combination of stakeholder knowledge and participation along with some centralized regulations is essential. More central regulation, that is, the application of SOX Sections 301, 204, and 404, is only part of the equation in the shakeout of fraudulent or poor-performing NGOs. More stakeholder participation is also a must. Stakeholders can be given more leverage if NGOs include the contacts for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the board members as well as the type and nature of the most recent audit, including the name of the auditor, in thank you notes to donors.