“Second-track” methods of resolving or mitigating interstate and intergroup conflicts have gained increased credence in recent years, but a continuing problem has been to persuade “first-track” diplomats to heed the results of these less formal, more analytic processes, especially if they represent the stronger party in an asymmetric conflict situation. Older theory suggests four conditions in which these “lions” can be persuaded: official endorsements of second-track processes; transferability of participants from the second track to the first; novelty of the insights produced; and strong follow-up. A comparison of the Maryland workshops (1983-83) focusing on British-Argentine conflict after the Falklands/Malvinas War with the more successful Canterbury workshops (1994-94) on civil conflict in Moldova suggests that, in addition to the classical “substitution” model relating track two to track one, two other models exist: role-switching (as in the Canterbury process) and demonstration (when a third-party observer later crafts an agreement and induces its acceptance). Lions are most likely to be persuaded when classical “substitution” conditions are met, when the timing of the second-track process is propitious, and when the stronger party is enabled to do realistic costing of the burdens of continuing to fight and the benefits of alternative courses of action.