The implications of “zeroing” for enforcement of US antidumping laws
Author:
William W. Nye a
| Affiliation: | a Economist, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, USA |
DOI:
10.1080/17487870903314641
Publication Frequency:
4 issues per year
Subject:
Development Economics;
Formats available:
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(English)
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PDF
(English)
Previously published as:
The Journal of Policy Reform
(1384-1289,
1477-2736)
until 2007
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Abstract
The United States enforces its antidumping laws differently from other countries. The United States, but not other countries, uses “zeroing” to determine whether imports are being sold in the US at less than “normal” value. Rather than simply comparing the “normal” value with the average sale price in the US, the US truncates the observations of US sales transactions, so that transactions at prices above “normal” value are counted as if they occurred at the “normal” value. This procedure, which has been challenged at least six times by the World Trade Organization, may cost the US $46-112 million/year.
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| Keywords: antidumping; zeroing; trade policy |
| Journal of Economic Literature Subject Code: F13 (Trade Policy; International Trade Organization) |
| view references (10) |

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