France's revised nuclear strategy, announced by President Jacques Chirac in June 2001, represents a move away from the Cold War 'anti-cities' strategy to one based on a more extensive range of options, including more precise and discriminate capabilities, intended to reinforce deterrence with choices beyond'all or nothing'. Neither of the main rationales for the nuclear posture - the long-standing hedge against potential major power threats and the current emphasis on being able to deter regional powers armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons - has provoked much open debate or critical analysis in France. To proponents of reduced nuclear spending, both contingencies seem improbable and not worth the current and projected costs. The thesis that France's nuclear forces constitute an indispensable contribution to the European Unions future deterrent posture appears an even less plausible justification to sceptics, who maintain that France could retain options for the EU and obtain approximately the same amount of security insurance with redefined nuclear posture requirements.